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LAW AND ALTERNATIVE SECURITY
Burns H. Weston*
Rightly or wrongly, nuclear weapons are regarded, in their threat
role at least, as effective guardians of national security.I Yet nothing is
more menacing to the survival of our planet than the credibly commu-
nicated threat to use nuclear weapons if and when sufficiently pro-
voked. Ergo, to escape the mind-boggling risks posed by nuclear
deterrence, thinking about how to ensure world security without rely-
ing upon nuclear weapons, either extensively or at all, is as much a
political as it is a moral imperative - in truth, a matter of physical
survival. Without an effective alternative to nuclear deterrence, there
is no letting go of the nuclear option, and without letting go of the
nuclear option the world never can be free of the possibility of radioac-
tive annihilation. Of course, because humankind has the knowledge of
how to build nuclear weapons, a knowledge that never can be re-
versed, it is highly doubtful that the world ever can be completely free
of the threat of nuclear war. Still, given an effective alternative to nu-
clear deterrence, with appropriate political will to match, it is possible
that the world can be free of such a threat almost completely - to a
degree sufficient, at any rate, to eliminate or reduce drastically the cur-
rent predisposition to rely upon nuclear weapons as a matter of rou-
tine, with few safeguards but the willingness of the nuclear weapons
States to perceive the common interest of continued human survival
inclusively.
Now, when contemplating the role of law and legal institutions in
this particular regard, one cannot help but feel a special inspiration
from the unswerving commitment to the world rule of law that so
marked the career of the wise and gentle man, William W. Bishop, Jr.,
to whom these pages are posthumously dedicated. As he counseled
© 1989 Burns H. Weston.
This article is adapted from a longer essay to be published in 1990 by Westview Press in ALTER-
NATIVE SECURITY: LIVING WITHOUT NUCLEAR DETERRENCE (B. Weston ed.).
* Bessie Dutton Murray Professor of Law, The University of Iowa; Member, Independent
Commission on World Security Alternatives (San Francisco, California); Member, Lawyers'
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1. With due respect to the cultural anthropologists who properly counsel against the "killer
ape" theory of human nature, see, e.g., A. ALLAND, THE HUMAN IMPERATIVE (1972), R.
DUBOS, BEAST OR ANGEL (1974), conflict is endemic to the human condition and the average
person is not easily dissuaded from a deterrence system that seems to have worked for better than
four decades now.
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over two decades ago, "under present conditions all [States] need in-
ternational law in order to continue to exist together on this planet. ' 2
But as Bill Bishop also would have said, ever skeptical of legal exhor-
tations divorced from socio-economic and political reality: beware the
limitations of law and legal institutions. "[F]actors other than the law
may be of great importance," he cautioned in the Preface to his, fa-
mous casebook, "often greater in a particular situation than are the
rules and principles of international law." '3
Bearing this caution in mind and noting, in particular, the contem-
porary State-centric structure of international relations, it seems futile
to try to imagine some legal initiative or set of legal initiatives that
alone might compete with nuclear weapons as a means of safeguarding
core national interests, real or perceived. Manifestly, nuclear weapons
are weapons of military decisiveness, and as a consequence any substi-
tute for them must be more- or less decisive also. Yet, embarked
though the world surely is upon a sea-change of historical transforma-
tion (at least as great as what took place following the end of the
Thirty Years' War and the onset of the Westphalian system in 1648),
we still live in the global Middle Ages, characterized by more than 150
separate fiefdoms, each with a monopoly control over the military, in-
strument and each only barely accountable in any formal sense either
to each other or to the larger arena in which they operate. And under
such historical circumstances, clearly, it is difficult to secure legal ini-
tiatives that alone can rise to the challenge of an essentially nuclear-
weapons-free world. Barring some truly radical change in the existing
world order, unforeseeable in the near term, it is not unreasonable, to
conclude that there really is no such thing as a purely legal alternative
or even a set of purely legal alternatives to nuclear deterrence, and that
there likely never will be.
This is not to say that international law is without any utility at the
present time. Indeed, as the Bishop casebook itself makes clear, it per-
forms, all things considered, remarkably well. Every hour of every
day ships ply the sea, planes pierce the clouds, and artificial satellites
roam outer space. Every hour of every day communications are trans-
mitted, goods and services traded, and people and things transported
from one country to another. Every hour of every day transactions
are made, resources exploited, and institutions created across national
and equivalent frontiers. And in all these respects, international law
- by which I mean the many processes of authoritative and control-
2. Bishop, General Course of Public International Law, 115 RECUEIL DES COURS 147, 467
(1965-II).
3. W. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS viii (3rd ed. 1971).
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ling transnational decision at all levels of social organization that help
to regulate such endeavors - is rather well observed on the whole; it
is an important and relevant force in the ordering of human relation-
ships worldwide. True, the international legal system is by no means
adequate in its force and effect, particularly in the realm of war and
peace. But no legal system, not even the most advanced, can boast
complete effectiveness; and all legal systems, again including the most
advanced, typically display a certain impotence when it comes to polit-
ically volatile or otherwise intractable issues of public policy.
Nor is an admission of the limitations of international law as a
substitute for nuclear weaponry the same as saying that international
law, fragile though it is at this historical time, cannot or should not
play an important role in some alternative strategy to nuclear deter-
rence. On the contrary, it can and must. But only as part of a larger
complex or medley of interdependent policy options - military, tech-
nological, economic, political, psychological, and spiritual, as well as
legal - that jointly can define an integrated, comprehensive and,
above all, decisive security system more or less free of nuclear weapons
and the threat of nuclear war. It is not that legal initiatives cannot
contribute to an alternative to nuclear deterrence capable of effectively
safeguarding core national interests, but that they cannot do so alone.
4
Indeed, any alternative to nuclear deterrence must be a composite or
medley of interpenetrating policy options if it is to do the job and do it
well. An alternative international security system must be conceived
as an integrated plan.
Which thus leads one to ask what some of the integral legal initia-
tives might be. What legal initiatives might contribute to a global se-
curity system more or less free of nuclear weapons and do so
effectively?
One obvious answer to this question is of course a genuine commit-
ment to the enactment of the kinds of "deep cuts" and related arms
reduction proposals that are contemplated in, for example, the Final
Act of the First U.N. General Assembly Special Session on Disarma-
ment adopted by consensus in June 1978. 5 Indeed, it would be no
small contribution were the superpowers and the other actual and
would-be nuclear weapons States seriously to commit themselves to
the twenty or so principal nuclear arms control/arms reduction agree-
4. As J. L. Brierly, whom Bill Bishop was fond of quoting, once wrote, international law "is
neither a myth on the one hand, nor a panacea on the other, but just one institution among
others which we can use for the building of a better international order." J. BRIERLY, THE LAW
OF NATIONS V (6th ed. 1963), quoted in Bishop, supra note 2, at 171.
5. G.A. Res. S-10/2 (S-X), 10 (Special) U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 4) at 3, U.N. Doc. A/S-10/
4 (1978).
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ments reached since 1959 which still are in force or immediately rele-
vant to the quest for peace in 1989 - and notwithstanding that only
one, the newly ratified INF Treaty, mandates any actual dismantling
of existing weapons or weapons systems and that many prohibit weap-
ons in environments where the military do not particularly want them
in the first place.6
Another answer, perhaps not so obvious but one that merits special
emphasis given the contempt of at least the superpowers toward the
international law of peace in recent years, is greatly increased respect
6. See the Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, 402 U.N.T.S.
71; the Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of a Direct Communication Link ("the Hot
Line Agreement"), June 20, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 825, T.I.A.S. No. 5362, 472 U.N.T.S. 163; the
Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water
("the Partial Test Ban Treaty"), Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433, 480 U.N.T.S.
43; the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies ("the Outer Space Treaty"), opened
for signature Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205; the Treaty for
the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America ("the Treaty of Tlateloco"), Feb. 14, 1967,
634 U.N.T.S. 326; the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons ("the NPT"),
opened for signature July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, T.I.A.S. No. 6839, 729 U.N.T.S. 161; the Treaty
on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass De-
struction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof ("the Seabed Arms
Control Treaty"), opened for signature Feb. 11, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 701, T.I.A.S. No. 7337, 955
U.N.T.S. 115; the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War
Between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ("the Accident Measures
Agreement"), Sept. 30, 1971, 22 U.S.T. 1590, T.I.A.S. No. 7186, 807 U.N.T.S. 57; the Agree-
ment Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on
Measures to Improve the USA-USSR Direct Communications Link ("the Hot Line Moderniza-
tion Agreement"), Sept. 30, 1971, 22 U.S.T. 1598, T.I.A.S. No. 7187, 806 U.N.T.S. 402; the
Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the
Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems ("the ABM Treaty"), May 26, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 3435,
T.I.A.S. No. 7503, 944 U.N.T.S. 13; the Interim Agreement Between the United States of
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures with Respect to the
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, May 26, 1972, 23 U.ST. 3462, T.I.A.S. No. 7504, 94
U.N.T.S. 3; the Declaration of Basic Principles of Relations Between the United States of
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, May 29, 1972, 66 DEP'T STATE BULL. 898
(1972); the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests, July 12, 1974, 71 DEP'T
STATE BULL. 217 (1974); the Limitation on Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems Treaty Protocol, July
3, 1974, United States-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 27 U.S.T. 1645, T.I.A.S. No. 8276;
the Joint Statement on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms ("the Vladivostok Agree-
ment"), April 29, 1974, 70 DEP'T STATE BULL. 677 (1974); the Final Act of the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe ("the Helsinki Accords"), Aug. 1, 1975, Dep't State Pub.
No. 8826 (Gen'l For. Pol. Ser. 298); the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon
and Other Celestial Bodies ("the Moon Treaty"), Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space, 34 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 20) 33, U.N. Doc. A/34/20 Annex 11 (1979); the
South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty, Aug. 6, 1985, 24 I.L.M. 1440; and the Treaty Between
the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of
Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles ("the INF Treaty"), Dec. 8, 1987, 88
DEP'T STATE BULL. 24 (Feb. 1988). See also the US-USSR Treaty and Protocol on Under-
ground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes, May 28, 1976, 74 DEP'T STATE BULL. 802
(1976) and the Treaty Between the United States of America and the SALT II Treaty, June 18,
1979, S. Exec. Doc. Y, 96th Cong, 1st Sess. 37 (1979).
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for, and adherence to, the already existing norms of restraint upon the
use of force in international relations as evidenced in, inter alia:
* the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact (or Pact of Paris);7 UN Charter Arti-
cle 2(4); the 1961 Declaration on the Prohibition of the Use of Nu-
clear Weapons and Thermo-nuclear Weapons; the 1965 Declaration
on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of
States and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty;8
the 1970 UN General Assembly Declaration on Principles of Inter-
national Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation
Among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Na-
tions;9 the 1972 Declaration on the Non-use of Force in Interna-
tional Relations and Permanent Prohibition on the Use of Nuclear
Weapons;' 0 the 1974 Resolution on the Definition of Aggression;"
the 1980 Resolution on the Non-use of Nuclear Weapons and Pre-
vention of Nuclear War; 12 - all outlawing the non-defensive threat
and use of force in the conduct of foreign relations' 3 and some out-
lawing specifically the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons;
" the principles established at Nuremberg and reaffirmed by the
United Nations thereafter;1 4
* the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide;' 5 and
" the humanitarian rules of international armed conflict, as embodied
7. Treaty Providing for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy, Aug.
27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, T.S. No. 796, 94 U.N.T.S. 57.
8. G.A. Res. 2131 (XX), 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 14) at 11, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1966).
9. G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028
(1971).
10. G.A. Res 2936, 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 5, U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1972).
11. G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631
(1975).
12. G.A. Res 35/152D, 35 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 48) at 69, U.N. Doc. A/35/48 (1980).
13. See also Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, arts. 8, 10-11, 49
Stat. 3097, T.S. No. 881, 165 L.N.T.S. 19 (also known as the "Montevideo Convention"); Pact of
the League of Arab States, March 22, 1945, art. 5, 70 U.N.T.S. 237; Charter of the Organization
of American States, April 30, 1948, chs. II, IV, V, 2 U.S.T. 2394, T.I.A.S. No. 2361, 119
U.N.T.S. 3 and Protocol of Amendment, Feb. 27, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 607, T.I.A.S. No. 6847 (also
known as the "Protocol of Buenos Aires"); the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance,
Sept. 2, 1947, 62 Stat. 1681, T.I.A.S. No. 1838, 121 U.N.T.S. 77 (also known as the "Rio Pact");
the American Treaty on Pacific Settlement, April 30, 1948, 30 U.N.T.S. 55 (also known as the
"Pact of Bogota"); and Charter of the Organization of African Unity, May 25, 1963, arts II, III,
479 U.N.T.S. 39.
14. See Charter of the International Military Tribunal, annex to the Agreement for the Pros-
ecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, art. 6, Aug. 8, 1945,
59 Stat. 1544, E.A.S. No. 472; 82 U.N.T.S. 279; Resolution Affirming the Principles of Interna-
tional Law Recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal, G.A. Res. 95(1), 1 U.N.
GAOR at 1144, U.N. Doc. A/236 (1946). See also JUDGMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILI-
TARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE TRIAL OF GERMAN MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS (1946).
15. Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
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in, inter alia, the 1907 Hague Regulations Respecting the Laws and
Customs of War;' 6 the 1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use
in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases;' 7 the Hague
Draft Rules of Aerial Warfare;' 8 the 1949 Convention [No. I] for
the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field; 19 the 1949 Convention [No. II] for the
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked
Members of Armed Forces at Sea;20 the 1949 Convention [No. III]
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War;2 1 the 1949 Conven-
tion Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War;22
and the 1977 Geneva Protocol I Additional Relating to the Protec-
tion of Victims of International Armed Conflicts. 23
Failures or refusals to adhere to these articulated norms may some-
times yield viscerally pleasing results over the short run, but rarely
if ever do they yield genuine security, to say nothing of justice, over
the long run. In a world that can easily and quickly reinvent nu-
clear weapons, it is respect - or lack of respect - for the legal
prohibitions against the threat and use of force, both defensive and
non-defensive, that will determine the fate of the Earth.
But what else can be done beyond a commitment to the princi-
pal arms control/arms reduction agreements reached since 1959
and to the international law of peace in general? What other legal
initiatives might contribute effectively to a global security system
more or less free of nuclear weapons?
The answer to this question does not come easily or swiftly.
Nevertheless, drawing heavily upon my colleagues from the In-
dependent Commission on World Security Alternatives,2 4 the Law-
yers' Committee on Nuclear Policy, 25 and the World Policy
16. Annex to the 1907 Hague Convention [No. IV] Respecting the Laws and Customs of
War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539.
17. Geneva Gas Protocol, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 575, T.I.A.S. 8061. 94 L.N.T.S.
18. Reprinted in 17 AM. J. INT'L L. 245 (Supp. 1923).
19. Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31.
20. Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S. No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85.
21. Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
22. Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
23. U.N. Doc. A/32/144, Annex 1 (1977).
24. The Commission is headquartered at 325 Ninth Street, San Francisco, CA 94103. Mem-
bers of the Commission, in addition to the author, are Anders Boserup, William Epstein, Willis
Harman, Donald Keys, Ward Morehouse, James O.C. Jonah, Betty Reardon, Indar Jit Rikhye,
and Louis B. Sohn.
25. The Committee is headquartered at 225 Lafayette Street, Suite 207, New York, NY
10012.
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Institute, 26 the following series of initiatives seem the most worthy
of responsible attention. Cast in terms of the normative, procedural,
and institutional dimensions of legal process, all presuppose at least
three conclusions deducible from an analysis of the present three to
four century-old international security system:first, that the present
militarily competitive international order cannot be expected to pre-
vent large-scale conventional or nuclear war for very long; second,
that the international system (legal and otherwise) can change; and
third, that the prospects for peace and security increase as societies
demilitarize, depolarize, denationalize, and transnationalize. 27
A. Normative Policy Options
Four normative regimes come immediately to mind as capable of
helping at least to demilitarize and depolarize the international
system:
1. A Comprehensive Nuclear Weapons Ban.28
The enforcement of existing relevant international law norms,
which interdict virtually any planned strategic or tactical use of nu-
clear weapons,29 is seriously encumbered by a tradition of political
leadership - Machiavellian in character - that typically indulges
self-serving interpretations of the legal status of controversial uses of
force. A pervasive subjectivity in world politics makes it exceedingly
hazardous to tie restraint vis-A-vis nuclear weapons to characteriza-
tions of warfare as "defensive" or "aggressive," these labels commonly
masking politically congenial and politically hostile uses of force.
Thus, while allowing, perhaps, for the possession and retention of
some nuclear weapons for use in extreme circumstances, a comprehen-
sive anti-nuclear-weapons regime is needed, one that would embrace at
least the following:
1 an absolute prohibition on first strike and other destabilizing weap-
26. The Institute is headquartered at 777 United Nations Plaza, New York, NY 10017.
27. See Johansen, Toward an Alternative Security System, in TOWARD NUCLEAR DISARMA-
MENT AND GLOBAL SECURITY: A SEARCH FOR ALTERNATIVES 569, 582-92 (B. Weston ed.
1984). Explains Johansen: "Whereas demilitarization pertains to military affairs, depolarization
applies to political and economic conditions, denationalization to social, cultural, and psycholog-
ical factors, and transnationalization to institutions." Id. at 586.
28. Many of the ideas enumerated here are derived from Falk, Toward a Legal Regime for
Nuclear Weapons, 28 McGILL L.J. 519, 537-38 (1963).
29. See, in particular, Weston, Nuclear Weapons Versus International Law: A Contextual
Reassessment, 28 MCGILL L.J. 542 (1983). See also Arbess, The International Law of Armed
Conflict in Light of Contemporary Deterrence Strategies: Empty Promises or Meaningful Re-
straint?, 30 McGILL L.J. 89 (1984); Boyle, The Relevance ofInternational Law to the "Paradox"
of Nuclear Deterrence, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 1407 (1986); Meyrowitz, The Opinions of Legal Schol-
ars on the Legal Status of Nuclear Weapons, 24 STAN. J. INT'L L. 111 (1988).
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ons systems, in particular the MX missile, the Trident II (D-5)
missile (under development), and the Pershing II and Soviet SS-20
missiles (because such weapons increase the pressure to "launch on
warning" and thereby increase the possibility of nuclear war by
accident or miscalculation);
2 a declaration that all research and development (R&D), war plans,
strategic doctrines, and strategic threats having first-strike charac-
teristics would be illegal per se, and that all persons knowingly as-
sociated with them would be deemed engaged in a continuing
criminal enterprise;
3 a presumption that virtually any actual use of nuclear weapons,
particularly a first use of such weapons (even in a "defensive"
mode), but also a second or retaliatory "countervalue" use (against
cities and other civilian targets), would violate the international
law of war and constitute a "crime against humanity";
4 a clear obligation on the part of all States to pursue nuclear dis-
armament and otherwise minimize the role of nuclear weapons in
inter-State conflict (per Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Prolifera-
tion Treaty, or "NPT" 30 ) by way of, inter alia,
4.1 a renunciation of the policy of first use and the war-fighting
doctrines and capabilities that accompany it;
4.2 a comprehensive test ban (CTB);31 and
4.3 a strengthened nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT)32
regime;
5 a ban on space-based missile defense systems (because such sys-
tems, especially if not preceded by deep cuts in offensive ballistic
missiles, are likely to encourage a proliferation of the most destabi-
lizing weapons and weapons systems); and
6 a clear mandate for all citizens to take whatever steps may be avail-
able to them, including acts of non-violent civil disobedience, to
expose the illegality of the use of nuclear weapons and to otherwise
insist upon the lawful conduct of the foreign policies of their own
governments. 33
2. A NA TO- Warsaw Pact Nonaggression Regime.
The question of across-the-board reductions in strategic and other
30. Supra note 6.
31. See, e.g., the Draft Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in All Environments, 47
DEP'T STATE BULL. 411 (1962).
32. See the NPT Treaty, supra note 6.
33. For pertinent discussion of such matters, see F. BOYLE, DEFENDING CIVIL RESISTANCE
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW (1987).
[Vol. 10:317
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nuclear forces is commonly seen as inextricably linked to a claimed
comparative advantage in conventional forces on the part of the War-
saw Pact countries relative to the NATO powers. A NATO-Warsaw
Pact mutual nonaggression regime, therefore, would seem a minimal
necessity for a nuclear weapons ban and, indeed, for a nuclear-weap-
ons-free alternative security system as a whole. As former U.S. Am-
bassador to the Soviet Union, George F. Kennan, "confessed" a few
years ago:
I am now bound to say that while the earliest possible elimination of
Soviet weaponry is of no less importance in my eyes than it ever was, this
would not be enough, in itself, to give Western civilization even an ade-
quate chance of survival. War itself, as a means of settling differences at
least between the great industrial powers, will have to be in some way
ruled out .... 34
In other words, to rid ourselves of the nuclear option we must rid
ourselves also of the war option, and this is, of course, a prescription
for basic system transformation Worldwide. A not illogical place to
begin, however, would be in the negotiation and conclusion of a mu-
tual nonaggression regime between the NATO and Warsaw Pact
countries that, in turn, would facilitate the dismantling of the vast mil-
itary establishments of the major powers that heretofore have pro-
vided, in substantial part, the excuse for the invention and deployment
of nuclear weapons and their supporting systems.
3. A Conventional Non-Proliferation Regime.
Just as there has been a proliferation of nuclear weapons since the
late 1940s, so also has there been a proliferation in the manufacture
and export of conventional weapons, particularly to the Third World.
This fact is well known.35 Yet, notwithstanding that this traffic in con-
ventional arms increases not only the destructiveness of conflict but
also the likelihood of bloody conflict erupting in the first place, the
world community stands by and does essentially nothing.
The world community does so, however, at great peril - indeed
greater peril than commonly is realized. Just as conventional arms are
"trip-wires" to conventional wars, so are conventional wars - and
their arms - "trip-wires" to nuclear conflict, capable of engaging the
superpowers and other nuclear-weapons States and thereby risking es-
calation to nuclear war. In the absence of a ban on the manufacture
and export of conventional weapons, a world more or less free of nu-
34. G. KENNAN, THE NUCLEAR DELUSION xxviii (1982).
35. See, e.g., R. SIVARD, WORLD MILITARY AND SOCIAL EXPENDITURES 1987-88, at 10-13
(1987).
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clear weapons would be similarly endangered. To the extent that, in
such a world, conventional wars could seriously jeopardize the real
and perceived interests of nuclear-prone States, so too could they serve
as catalysts to the "reinvention" and subsequent actual use of nuclear
weapons to safeguard those interests.
Thus, a conventional non-proliferation regime, greatly limiting if
not altogether prohibiting conventional arms traffic, would seem as
much a necessity to a nuclear-weapons-free security system as the ex-
isting nuclear non-proliferation regime is to the present-day nuclear
deterrence system. Particularly does it seem a necessity vis d vis such
large items as tanks, armored cars, warships, jet aircraft, and missiles
which, in addition to being the most easily detected, are the most de-
structive of conventional weapons. At the very least, such a regime
should ensure an effective surveillance and record-keeping system, ca-
pable at least of alerting responsible elites of the presence of dangerous
world practices and trends.
4. A US-USSR Nonintervention Regime.
It is clear to the informed citizen at least that the current nuclear
deterrence system is in reality a system of extended deterrence, meant
to guard against far more than European battlefield confrontations
and intercontinental strategic attacks. Both the United States and the
Soviet Union have strong hegemonic interests in keeping the other out
of their respective spheres of influence and, beyond that, out of so-
called nonaligned countries. But it is clear, too, that this extended or
hegemonic deterrence system is of necessity nuclear because the econ-
omies of neither the United States nor the Soviet Union can afford,
without major domestic sacrifice, a conventional one. Thus, because
the strong economic and political interests of the two superpowers
simply will not go away, it is essential that an alternative security sys-
tem make as one of its cornerstones a compact by each government to
refrain from sending any of its armed forces into the other's clear
sphere of influence or into any nonaligned country, even if invited. A
mutual promise of self-restraint on the part of both superpowers, espe-
cially one that would ensure their observance of the territorial integ-
rity and political independence of Third World countries, would go a
long way toward guaranteeing the viability of a global security system
essentially free of nuclear weapons. Where force may be needed to
prevent or minimize deprivations of fundamental human rights and
freedoms, then resort should be had to the global and regional inter-
governmental organizations that are designed to police such matters
on a multilateral basis.
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B. Procedural Policy Options
An alternative security system that forswears reliance upon nu-
clear weapons can provide no security at all without clearly estab-
lished and respected procedures for both peacekeeping and
peacemaking. If inter-State disputes can be prevented from degenerat-
ing into armed hostilities or settled by peaceful means, then they are
unlikely to escalate into threats to the peace or acts of aggression and
war. It is true that the past record of undertakings to keep the peace
under the aegis of the United Nations and to achieve dispute settle-
ment through international tribunals, arbitration and similar peaceful
means has not been, until very recently, encouraging. But established
and respected procedures for multilateral peacekeeping and for the
mediation, conciliation, arbitration, and adjudication of international
disputes would seem nevertheless to be a sine qua non for the mainte-
nance of world peace and security. Without the active participation of
States in peaceful efforts to accommodate each other, there is little
likelihood of achieving the stability and harmony that a nuclear-weap-
ons-free world requires.
Thus the following modest procedural initiatives would seem nec-
essary and useful (perhaps especially at the early stages of interna-
tional accommodation and nuclear disarmament):
1. Improve UN Peacekeeping Opportunities and Capabilities36
1.1 by assuring peacekeeping finances on an automatic basis, possibly
through a percentage surcharge added to annual assessed
contributions;
1.2 by guaranteeing military units on a more or less permanent
standby basis (as envisaged in UN Charter Article 43), trained
for peacekeeping by the member States in the course of their ar-
mies' basic training and on the basis of expertise and additional
training provided by an appropriate UN agency;
1.3 by regularly stockpiling military equipment and supplies needed
to enhance the UN's capacity to undertake peacekeeping opera-
tions on short notice;
1.4 by ensuring access to conflict areas without requiring the initial or
continuing permission of the conflicting parties;
1.5 by facilitating automatic peacekeeping action on the basis of pre-
determined levels of crisis or thresholds of conflict; and
36. Some of the ideas enumerated here are derived from REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT
COMMISSION ON DISARMAMENT AND SECURITY ISSUES: COMMON SECURITY - A
PROGRAMME FOR DISARMAMENT, also known as the "Palme Commission Report," U.N. Doc.
A/CN.10/38 (1983).
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1.6 by tying peacekeeping to peacemaking (i.e., pacific settlement) so
as to ensure that the merits of any given dispute will receive the
attention that is needed to achieve long-term stability in the trou-
bled area.
2. Improve Peacemaking Opportunities and Capabilities3 7
2.1 by enhancing and making greater use of UN dispute settlement
mechanisms, most of which have been rarely if ever used (such as
the General Assembly's 1949 Panel for Inquiry and Consulta-
tion, a 1950 Peace Observation Commission, and a 1967 Register
of Experts on Fact-Finding);
2.2 by establishing a joint inter-State consultation commission with a
permanent staff composed of the nationals of both parties
(among others) capable of handling potential disputes by way of
routine review rather than the usual procedure of consulting only
in extraordinary circumstances;
2.3 by creating a joint inter-State negotiating commission composed
of nationals from both parties working together to find a solution
acceptable to all concerned;
2.4 by encouraging consent to mediation, conciliation, arbitration,
and adjudication via
2.4.1 guarantees limiting the scope of the third-party judgment
to the determination of the doctrines, principles and rules
that could guide the parties in approaching settlement;
and
2.4.2 greater use of technically non-binding advisory opinions;
2.5 by increasing reliance on private persons and NGOs as neutral in-
termediaries (and thereby helping to avoid escalating the argu-
ment to a full-scale inter-State dispute)
2.5.1 in pre-dispute consultations and in post-dispute negotiated
settlements; and
2.5.2 before international tribunals for the purpose of clarifying
a customary law norm or a clause in an international
agreement; and
2.6, by adopting a code of international peacemaking procedures
-(drawn from a variety of existing instruments) that would allow
governmental officials to develop confidence in available proce-
dures and that States could accept as binding upon them in
whole or in part.
37. The ideas enumerated here are derived from Sohn, Peaceful Settlement of Disputes and
International Security, a "preliminary draft" of an unpublished manuscript submitted to the
Independent Commission on World Security Alternatives, supra note 24.
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Of course, all of these and similar procedural initiatives have their
share of difficulties: winning the confidence of contentious sovereign
powers; achieving genuine neutrality in disputes; maintaining effective
communication; and so forth. But all are nonetheless worthwhile be-
cause they would directly help to demilitarize, depolarize, denational-
ize, and transnationalize the international system: outcomes that, as
indicated above, enhance the prospects for international peace and
security. 38
C. Institutional Policy Options
At least four institutional responses recommend themselves to an
alternative security system, each directly helping - some perhaps
within the framework of the United Nations, some not - to denation-
alize and transnationalize the international system. 39
1. Create an international technological development and weapons
program agency to foster joint research of defensive technologies by a
multilateral team of scientists and to prevent and restrain arms build-
ups. Such an organ would, for example, provide the United States
with the opportunity to make good on election pledges to share defen-
sive technology with the Soviet Union and to facilitate missile defense
research without imperiling the ABM Treaty 4° or otherwise exacerbat-
ing the arms race. Also, it could reduce inclinations to surprise the
other side with new and threatening developments. As such it could
well provide a turning point in world affairs.
2. Establish an international satellite observation agency that
would supplement national means of verification and would be capable
of the transnational monitoring of world military capabilities and
movements. Such an agency could (a) oversee the implementation of
arms control and arms reduction agreements; (b) provide an impartial
means of detecting and possibly discouraging secret nuclear tests by
countries on the threshold of developing nuclear weapons; (c) discour-
age provocative military buildups and maneuvers; and (d) otherwise
acquire the vital experience and reliability needed if arms reductions
are ever to proceed very far.
3. Convene periodic regional conferences on security and coopera-
tion similar to the one launched in Helsinki for Europe in 1975. Such
conferences, which would reflect the priorities and circumstances of
38. See R. SIVARD, supra note 35 and accompanying text.
39. For the first two proposals enumerated here I am indebted to Arbess & Epstein, Dis-
armament Role for the United Nations?, 41 BULL. OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 26, 28 (May
1985).
40. Supra note 6.
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the separate regions but to which representatives from the United Na-
tions Secretariat might be invited, could serve the essential decision
function of appraisal and recommendation not only on matters relat-
ing directly to international security but on economic, social, and cul-
tural matters as well and upon which international security often
depends.
4. Create permanent global or regional police forces consisting of
individually recruited persons instead of contingents from various na-
tional military forces (as has occurred in past UN peacekeeping expe-
rience). Such a force, loyal to authorities acting on behalf of the world
or regional community, could not be suddenly dissipated by the unan-
ticipated withdrawal of national contingents (as has happened with ad
hoc UN forces in the Middle East, for example). Because it would be
more efficiently integrated, more readily available, less subject to
charges of unreliability due to divided loyalties, and better able to
build useful precedents over time, such a global or regional force
would be a further significant step in assuring a successful security
system not dependent on nuclear weapons.
Of course, in addition to these four institutional initiatives one
could mention the possibility that the United Nations, because it mir-
rors the power structure that existed at its birth, has outlived its use-
fulness as a security system and therefore should be replaced by a new
international authority (or cluster of authorities) that reflect(s) the
growing aspiration for a restructured international order, possessing
strengthened conflict resolution capabilities. So sweeping an initiative,
however, seems beyond the capacity of existing international actors
and, in any event, constitutes a precarious option for the foreseeable
future. It could be deviously used, out of some nostalgic yearning for
a bygone era, to banish the United Nations without in any way provid-
ing for its replacement. Still, this possibility should be noted.
Thus: some legal initiatives that could contribute effectively to a
more or less nuclear-weapons-free global security system - but only,
of course, as part of an integrated plan.
It bears emphasis, however, that no mention has been made of yet
another initiative, legal as well as political and economic, that surely is
indispensable to any such system: the promotion and protection of
fundamental human rights and freedoms, including the right of all
people to at least their basic economic, social, and cultural needs as
well as to the basic decencies and participatory rights that are sub-
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sumed within the meaning of civil and political rights.41 These and
related human rights considerations are beyond the scope of this brief
overview, but it should not go unnoticed that today's "zones of inter-
national peace" tend to be found primarily among the industrial de-
mocracies and that the industrial democracies, though clearly
imperfect in their distribution of material rewards, tend to be rich as
well as democratic. 42
Also, it bears emphasis that it is not, on final analysis, treaties and
charters prescribing specific norms, procedures, and institutions that
will guarantee an enduring condition of peace among nations. It is,
rather, the ingrained assumptions and habits of men and women
everywhere, above all men and women in government and other are-
nas of public responsibility, that ultimately will be determinative in
this regard. And if an international security system that consciously
abjures reliance upon nuclear weapons is to succeed, then these as-
sumptions and habits will have to move beyond the present, singular
focus on national security to the wider notion of global security. The
entire human race - not one national constituent of it - must be-
come the conscious beneficiary of all alternative security initiatives. A
sense of species solidarity and a concern for all peoples, not just the
ruling elites, must underwrite all proposals for alternative security as
we proceed, in the words of Jesuit philosopher Pierre Teilhard de
Chardin, in "the planetization of Mankind."
All this said, however, a haunting question hovers over this analy-
sis, just as it hovers over every analysis about alternatives to nuclear
deterrence: has humankind the acumen and the political will to do
something constructive before it is too late? That is the real issue in
these and all related discussions at the present time. And in this con-
nection it is helpful to recall the sage words of Professor Bishop: "The
'nuclear balance of terror,' " he wrote, "sharpens the need for a work-
able system to keep international peace at the same time that it under-
lines the importance of international law and UN Charter prohibitions
against the use of force in international relations. '43 The haunting
question that hovers over us, in other words, is whether we can re-
41. For a wide-ranging discussion of these and related human rights concerns, see HUMAN
RIGHTS IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY (R. Claude and B. Weston eds., The University of Penn-
sylvania Press 1989).
42. The nexus between a stable international peace, on the one hand, and political democracy
and equitable distribution, on the other, is extensively explored in Russett, The Politics of an
Alternative Security System: Toward A More Democratic and Therefore More Peaceful World, in
ALTERNATIVE SECURITY: LIVING WITHOUT NUCLEAR DETERRENCE (B. Weston ed., West-
view Press, forthcoming 1990).
43. Bishop, supra note 2, at 161.
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spond to the need and perceive the importance of which Bill Bishop
spoke. If so, then a new global security is a serious possibility.
